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RECALL OF APPELLATE MANDATES
IN FEDERAL CIVIL LITIGATION
Upon entry of a final judgment in federal court, a disap-
pointed litigant may attack the decision in several ways. If a
higher court has jurisdiction to hear the case, he may launch a
direct attack through appeal. Alternatively, he might launch a col-
lateral attack on the judgment when his opponent brings an en-
forcement action. Or he might bring his own action, attempting to
squeeze the case into the exceptions to res judicata t But even if
appeal is unavailable and if the judgment is both valid and ines-
capable, one other option remains open: the litigant may return
to the court that rendered the judgment and petition the court to
reconsider. If the court agrees, it will recall its prior mandate and
decide the case anew.2
Relief from district court judgments may be had through the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 60 carefully delineates the
circumstances in which a district court may correct its own er-
rors.3 An appellate court, however, has no such guidance and
1 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 61.2 (Tent. Draft No. 1 1973) and RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 68.1 (Tent. Draft No. 4 1977). See notes 125-26 infra.
I See 24 VILL. L. REv. 157 (1978).
3 FED. R. Civ. P. 60 provides:
(a) Clerical Mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of
the record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may be cor-
rected by the court at any time of its own initiative or on the motion of any
party and after such notice, if any, as the court orders. During the pendency of
an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected before the appeal is docketed in
the appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is pending may be so cor-
rected with leave of the appellate court.
(b) Mistakes; Inadvertence; Excusable Neglect; Newly Discovered Evidence;
Fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a
party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding
for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable ne-
glect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been
discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether
heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other mis-
conduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has
been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is
based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that
the judgment should have prospective application; or (6) any other reason jus-
tifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made
within a reasonable time, and for reasons (1), (2), and (3) not more than one
year after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion
under this subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of the judgment or sus-
pend its operation. This rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain an
independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order, or proceeding,
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must chart its own course when asked to reconsider one of its
final judgments. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not
apply to appellate proceedings,4 and the Federal Rules of Appel-
late Procedure, which allow petitions for rehearing 5 and for the
issue and stay of mandates,6 make no provisions for "recalls" of
or to grant relief to a defendant not actually personally notified as provided in
Title 28, U.S.C. § 1655, or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court.
Writs of coram nobis, coram vobis, audita querela, and bills of review and bills
in the nature of bills of review, are abolished, and the procedure for obtaining
any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these rules or by
an independent action.
4 See American Iron & Steel Inst. v. EPA, 560 F.2d 589, 593 n.17 (3d Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 914 (1978); Hines v. Royal Indem. Co., 253 F.2d 111, 113 (6th Cir. 1958);
Pierce v. Cook & Co., 518 F.2d 720, 726 (10th Cir. 1975) (dissenting opinion), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 1079 (1976); 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE:
CIVIL § 1012, at 73 (1969).
5 FED. R. App. P. 40(a) provides:
(a) Time for Filing; Content; Answer; Action by Court if Granted. A petition
for rehearing may be filed within 14 days after entry of judgment unless the
time is shortened or enlarged by order. The petition shall state with particular-
ity the points of law or fact which in the opinion of the petitioner the court has
overlooked or misapprehended and shall contain such argument in support of
the petition as the petitioner desires to present. Oral argument in support of
the petition will not be permitted. No answer to a petition for rehearing will be
received unless requested by the court, but a petition for rehearing will ordinar-
ily not be granted in the absence of such a request. If a petition for rehearing is
granted the court may make final disposition of the cause without reargument
or resubmission or may make such other orders as are deemed appropriate
under the circumstances of the particular case.
6 FED. R. App. P. 41 provides:
(a) Date of Issuance. The mandate of the court shall issue 21 days after
the entry of judgment unless the time is shortened or enlarged by order. A
certified copy of the judgment and a copy of the opinion of the court, if any,
and any direction as to costs shall constitute the mandate, unless the court di-
rects that a formal mandate issue. The timely filing of a petition for rehearing
will stay the mandate until disposition of the petition unless otherwise ordered
by the court. If the petition is denied, the mandate shall issue 7 days after entry
of the order denying the petition unless the time is shortened or enlarged by
order.
(b) Stay of Mandate Pending Application for Certiorari. A stay of the
mandate pending application to the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari may
be granted upon motion, reasonable notice of which shall be given to all par-
ties. The stay shall not exceed 30 days unless the period is extended for cause
shown. If during the period of the stay there is filed with the clerk of the court
of appeals a notice from the clerk of the Supreme Court that the party who has
obtained the stay has filed a petition for the writ in that court, the stay shall
continue until final disposition by the Supreme Court. Upon the filing of a
copy of an order of the Supreme Court denying the petition for certiorari the
mandate shall issue immediately. A bond or other security may be required as a
condition to the grant or continuance of a stay of the mandate.
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mandates. 7 In the absence of an applicable Federal Rule of Ap-
pellate Procedure, the individual circuits are free to make their
own rules, so long as they are not inconsistent with the Federal
Rules.8 Most circuits recognize, either by rule or through judicial
interpretation, that mandates can be recalled 9 to "prevent injus-
tice" 10 or upon a showing of "good cause."11
Obviously, the phrases "good cause" and "to prevent injus-
tice" are not self-defining. Appellate courts need standards and
guidelines for dealing with petitions for recall of mandates. Ar-
ticulating such standards should minimize needless confusion and
result in more uniform decisions. Through an analysis of the un-
derlying policies and the historical development of procedures
used to grant relief from judgments, this Note will identify situa-
tions where recall of an appellate mandate is proper.
I
CONFLICTING POLICY INTERESTS: FINALITY VERSUS CORRECTNESS
A motion to recall runs squarely against the policy that judi-
cial decisions, once made, are final. Solid reasons undergird this
policy of finality. First, the judicial system exists to resolve dis-
putes, to bring them to an end so that the litigants can return to
their normal affairs. In addition to this immediate effect, finality
gives litigants a continuing measure of certainty by allowing them
to rely upon the court's decision. For instance, a party who has
won a quiet title action should be free to develop the land without
fear that this judgment is open to attack.1" Allowing repeated
challenges to the decisions of a court erodes faith in the judicial
system. As Justice Harlan once wrote, "I can think of nothing
more unsettling to lawyers and litigants, and more disturbing to
their confidence in the evenhandedness of the Court's processes,
See 9 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 241.02[4] (2d ed 1975).
8 FED. R. App. P. 47. See also Hines v. Royal Indem. Co., 253 F.2d 111, 113 (6th Cir.
1958).
9 Two circuits have rules dealing with recalls. See 5TH CIR. R. 15; 8TH CIR. R. 18.
Many other circuits have found authority to recall without the aid of court rules.
See, e.g., American Iron & Steel Inst. v. EPA, 560 F.2d 589, 592-94 (3d Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 914 (1978); Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 463 F.2d 268, 276-77
(D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972). See generally 16 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER,
supra note 4, § 3938.
10 See note 74 infra.
1' See note 72 infra.
12 See United States v. Throckmorton, 98 U.S. 61 (1878).
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than to be left in ... uncertainty ... as to when their cases may be
considered finally closed in this Court." 13 Finally, allowing re-
peated hearings of the same dispute wastes judicial resources.
A motion to recall finds its support in the desire to reach a
just result. "The recall of an appellate mandate to avoid injustice
is a continuation, in the appellate sphere, of a deeply rooted
equity jurisprudence." 14 To say that courts exist to resolve dis-
putes tells only half the story, for courts exist to resolve disputes
correctly. Denying relief to meritorious litigants is unfair, espe-
cially when the denial stems from a court-made policy of finality
rather than from substantive law. Allowing manifestly unjust re-
sults to stand uncorrected also erodes public faith in the judicial
process.
II
HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF RECALL DOCTRINE
A. The Term Rule
Prior to the enactment of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, federal courts achieved finality of judgments through a de-
vice called the "term rule." 15 The classic formulation of the term
rule is found in Bronson v. Schulten: 16
It is a general rule of the law that all the judgments, decrees, or
other orders of the courts, however conclusive in their charac-
ter, are under the control of the court which pronounces them
during the term at which they are rendered or entered of rec-
ord, and they may then be set aside, vacated, modified, or an-
nulled by that court.
But it is a rule equally well established, that after the term
has ended all final judgments and decrees of the court pass
beyond its control, unless steps be taken during that term, by
motion or otherwise, to set aside, modify, or correct them .... 17
This rule had two exceptions. A court could modify a judgment at
a later term if it expressly reserved control over the judgment
" United States v. Ohio Power Co., 353 U.S. 98, 111 (1957) (dissenting opinion).
14 Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 463 F.2d 268, 279 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972).
15 1 A. FREEMAN, LAw OF JUDGMENTS § 69 (4th ed. 1892); see generally Moore & Rogers,
Federal Relief from Civil Judgments, 55 YALE L.J. 623, 627 (1946).
16 104 U.S. 410 (1881).
17 Id. at 415.
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during the term in which it was rendered.' 8 A court could also
correct mere clerical errors or matters of form in a later term. x9
Thus the term rule and its exceptions established a clumsy and
arbitrary balance between the policies of finality and correctness.
It caught the most glaring errors (those that became apparent to
the parties before the expiration of the term) and the mere tech-
nical mistakes (those that did not go to the merits of the judg-
ment). In the interests of finality, however, this framework con-
signed the vast middle range of errors to stand uncorrected.
B. Procedures for Avoiding the Term Rule
To provide relief in special instances where the term rule
produced unduly harsh results, the common law and equity courts
developed ancillary remedies that allowed a court to look into its
own final judgments. 0  Each remedy was developed to cover a
distinct situation deemed inequitable enough to warrant further
proceedings. 21
'8 See, e.g., Bernards v. Johnson, 314 U.S. 19, 29-30 (1941); United States v. Swift &
Co., 286 U.S. 106, 114 (1931). See 2 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 6.09[2], at 1500.110-.111
(2d ed. 1978); Moore & Rogers, supra note 15, at 627.
19 See, e.g., Fairmont Creamery Co. v. Minnesota, 275 U.S. 70, 72 (1927); Bank of the
United States v. Moss, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 31, 38 (1847); Bank of Ky. v. Wistar, 28 U.S. (3
Pet.) 431, 432 (1830); The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1, 4 (1827); Hart v. Wiltsee, 25 F.2d
863, 863 (1st Cir. 1928) (per curiam), cert. dented, 275 U.S. 559 (1927). See 1 A. FREEMAN,
supra note 15, at § 71.
20 Other commentators have discussed these ancillary remedies. See 7 MooRE's FEDERAL
PRACTICE 60.13-.16 (2d ed. 1978); 11 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 4, § 2867
(1973); Moore & Rogers, supra note 15, at 659-82.
21 The ancillary remedies were invoked by petitioning the same court that had entered
the judgment and were considered to be an extension of the earlier proceeding rather than
a new action. See 2 T. STREET, FEDERAL EQUITY PRACTICE § 2185 (1909). This use of ancil-
lary jurisdiction avoided the complications of finding an independent jurisdictional basis
for the action. A decision to grant relief under an ancillary remedy involved matters of
policy rather than jurisdiction.
Historically, the term rule can be adequately explained as a rule of repose
(somewhat analogous to a statute of limitations), which the common law and
equity courts invoked to give finality to their judgments. Thus, when these
courts evolved the ancillary remedies, such as corara nobis, coram vobis, audita
querela, bill of review, and bill in the nature of a bill of review, and the inde-
pendent action in equity, which gave relief long after term time, they were not
enlarging their jurisdiction, but were merely recognizing that under certain cir-
cumstances their self-imposed rule of repose should be relaxed.
2 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 11 6.09[21, at 1500.114-.115 (2d ed. 1978) (footnotes omitted).
The ancillary remedies were spawned through the union of a court's supervisory power to
protect its judgments and the policy of achieving a correct, just result. Born of this union
and living within the bounds of the judgments they modified, the ancillary remedies ex-
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The common law courts used two basic writs to remedy these
situations. The writ of error coram nobis (or its variant, coram
vobis) 22 was used to raise some material fact that existed at the
time of the trial but had gone unnoticed by the court.23 Coram
nobis was unavailable if the error was apparent from the face of
the record or if the proponent negligently withheld the informa-
tion until after the entry of judgment. 24  The writ of audita
querela was used to relieve a party from the wrongful acts of his
adversary.2 5 This writ was used to correct a matter arising after
pired only through laches. See 7 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 60.13-.15, at 38, 53, 62 (2d
ed. 1978).
The authority to recall an appellate mandate derives from the ancillary remedies be-
cause the recall doctrine developed in part from them. Hence when courts refer to their
"inherent power" to recall mandates they apparently are referring to the union of their
supervisory power over judgments and the policy of achieving just results. See, e.g., Reserve
Mining Co. v. Lord, 529 F.2d, 181, 188 (8th Cir. 1976); Perkins v. Standard Oil Co., 487
F.2d 672, 674 (9th Cir. 1973); Dickerson v. Continental Oil Co., 476 F.2d 635, 636 (5th
Cir. 1973). Although it may be correct simply to state that a court has inherent powers to
recall mandates, it is misleading to think in terms ofjurisidiction and power rather than in
terms of conflicting policies. See notes 12-14 and accompanying text supra. In addition, it is
unnecessary to search, as one court has done, for a statute that grants jurisdiction to hear
recall petitions. See Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 463 F.2d 268, 277 (D.C. Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972) (finding statutory authority to recall in language of
28 U.S.C. § 2106: "court[s] of appellate jurisdiction may ... require such further proceed-
ings to be had as may be just under the circumstances.").
22 The difference between coram nobis and coram vobis is of historical significance only.
The distinction originated from the court in which the writ was brought-it was called
coram nobis if brought in the King's Bench and coram vobis if brought in the Court of
Common Pleas. See Moore & Rogers, supra note 15, at 669; Orfield, The Writ of Error Coram
Nobis in Civil Practice, 20 VA. L. REv. 423, 425 (1934). See also BLAcK's LAw DICrIONARY
1785-86 (rev. 4th ed. 1968).
23 Freeman described coram nobis as follows:
If ... the proceedings are based upon facts presumed by the court to exist, as
when one of the parties is insane, or is an infant or afeme covert, or has died
before verdict, and the court, supposing such party to be alive and competent
to appear as a litigant, renders judgment, it may be set aside by a writ of coram
nobis. But this writ does not lie to correct any error in the judgment of the
court, nor to contradict or put in issue any fact directly passed upon and af-
firmed by the judgment itself.... The writ of error coram nobis is not intended
to authorize any court to review and revise its opinions; but only to enable it to
recall some adjudication made while some fact existed which, if before the
court, would have prevented the rendition of the judgment, and which, without
any fault or negligence of the party, was not presented to the court.
1 A. FREEMAN, supra note 15, § 94, at 129 (footnote omitted).
24 See Orfield, supra note 22, at 424. See generally Moore & Rogers, supra note 15, at
669-74.
25 See 1 A. FREEMAN, supra note 15, § 95, at 130. Blackstone described it as "a writ of a
most remedial nature, and seems to have been invented, lest in any case there should be an
oppressive defect of justice, where a party has a good defence, but by the ordinary forms
of law had no opportunity to make it." 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *405.
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the judgment, as when a defendant neglected to record his satis-
faction of a judgment and the plaintiff then demanded payment a
second time.2 6  Because of audita querela's remedial nature, it was
also used to reopen judgments obtained through one party's per-
petration of a fraud on his opponent or on the court.27
In their independent attempts to remedy obvious injustices,
the two writs began to cover much the same ground. Coram nobis
eventually expanded to remedy cases of fraud.28 Therefore the
distinct writs no longer covered distinct situations. Not only did
the courts stretch the substance of the writs, but they also began
to depart from the technical formalities. Courts allowed the writs
to be raised on motion, 29 a procedure much "more simple, more
expeditious, and less fruitful of difficulty and expense."30  Thus
parties could request relief through a motion alleging error or
injustice. And whether applying the writs or motions, courts drew
no distinction on whether they were addressed to an appellate or
a trial court.31
26 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *404.
27 See 1 A. FREEMAN, supra note 15, § 95, at 130.
28 This extension seems to have developed from cases involving both a fraud and missing
material facts. For example, the writ could be used when one party actively concealed
jurisdictional facts from the court and the other party later discovered the fraud. Although
the writ of coram nobis was technically being used to bring the true facts before the court, it
appeared as if it were being used to remedy the fraud. See Orfield, supra note 22, at
432-33. When used to examine a fraud that occurred prior to the rendition of judgment,
audita querela became almost indistinguishable from coram nobis. See Moore & Rogers, supra
note 15, at 660-61, 670; 1 A. FREEMAN, supra note 15, § 95, at 130; 7 MooRE's FEDERAL
PRACTICE 60.13, 60.14 at 34, 47 (2d ed. 1978).
29 Harris v. Hardeman, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 334, 346 (1852). See Pickett's Heirs v.
Legerwood, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 107, 110 (1833). Blackstone noted that an "indulgence now
shewn by the courts in granting a summary relief upon motion, in cases of such evident
oppression, has almost rendered useless the writ of audita querela, and driven it quite out of
practice." 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *405.
30 Harris v. Hardeman, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 334, 346 (1852).
31 See Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 256 (1943) (dissent-
ing opinion, Roberts, J.). Relief was requested, and sometimes granted, in both trial and
appellate courts. In Bronson v. Schulten, 104 U.S. 410 (1881), most famous for its formu-
lation of the term rule, the plaintiff brought an action to amend the trial court's judgment
17 years after it was entered and was granted relief by the court which had entered
the judgment. The defendant appealed and the Supreme Court reversed, holding that
coram vobis did not apply in this situation and that the trial court had no power to change
the judgment once the term ended. In Pickett's Heirs v. Legerwood, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 107
(1833), the trial court sustained the plaintiff's writ of error coram vobis, and the defendant
appealed. The Supreme Court held that since a coram vobis action enabled the court below
to correct an error in a prior judgment, the granting of the coram vobis motion was not a
final judgment and therefore was not appealable. See also Cameron v. M'Roberts, 16 U.S (3
Wheat.) 303 (1818) (application to set aside decree of district court denied). With the pre-
ceding cases, compare the following cases where a litigant requested that an appellate court
710
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The ancillary remedy used by courts of equity to reexamine
decrees was a bill of review (or its variant, a bill in the nature of a
bill of review) .32 Courts could use it to correct errors of law ap-
pearing on the face of the decree and to bring forth newly
discovered evidence, 33 but not to impeach a decree for fraud.3 4
Nor could an appellate court use it to review an appellate decree.
Appellate courts could, however, grant leave for a lower court to
entertain a bill of review for newly discovered evidence.3 5
In addition to the ancillary remedies, another method of ob-
taining relief from a judgment has existed for centuries-an in-
dependent action in equity.3 6  The traditional requirements for
an independent action included an inequitable or unconscionable
judgment, a good claim or defense to the cause of action on
which the judgment was founded, a fraud, accident, or mistake
that prevented use of the claim or defense, lack of fault or negli-
gence on the part of the aggrieved party, and lack of an adequate
remedy at law.3 7  Hence the independent action in equity pro-
vided slightly broader grounds for relief than did the various an-
cillary remedies. In addition, since the independent action was a
new law suit rather than a continuation of the old action, the
plaintiff was not necessarily restricted to the judgment-rendering
court .3  The catch, however, was that he had to esiablish inde-
pendent jurisdictional grounds for the new action. In federal
court this could mean that the litigant had to show a basis for
assertion of federal jurisdiction, that the suit involved the requisite
amount in controversy, and that all parties were served with pro-
reopen its judgment: Fairmont Creamery Co. v. Minnesota, 275 U.S. 270 (1927) (errors in
clauses on interest and costs not clerical error and therefore not within exception to term
rule justifying recall); Peck v. Sanderson, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 42 (1855) (attorney missing oral
argument due to illness insufficient error to open judgment in next term); Ex parte
Crenshaw, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 119 (1841) (omission in record of marshal's failure to serve party
with notification of appeal held sufficient to open judgment during next term).
'2 Courts properly used bills of review to scrutinize decrees that had been enrolled and
bills in the nature of a bill of review to examine decrees that had not been enrolled. See J.
STORY, EQUITY PLEADINGS § 403 (10th ed. 1892). See also Moore & Rogers, supra note 15, at
675.
33 See 2 T. STREET, FEDERAL EQUITY PRACTICE § 2119 (1909); J. STORY, supra note 32,
§§ 404-12. See generally Moore & Rogers, supra note 15, at 675-82.
a See 2 T. STR Er, supra note 33, at §§ 2121, 2185.
3 See id. at §§ 2178-79.
See generally 7 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 60.36-60.39 (2d ed. 1978); 11 C.
WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 4, § 2868 (1973).
37 National Sur. Co. v. State Bank, 120 F. 593, 599 (8th Cir. 1903).
38 See 7 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 60.36, at 602 (2d ed. 1978). See also note 21
supra.
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cess. Fortunately for the plaintiff, modern courts have relaxed the
jurisdictional requirements in some cases. An independent action
brought in the judgment-rendering court is considered to be an
exercise of the court's ancillary jurisdiction. 39 Thus with the pos-
sibility of invoking either the rendering court's ancillary jurisdic-
tion or the jurisdiction of other courts, plus its slightly broader
grounds for relief, the independent action was a somewhat more
expansive remedy than any of the ancillary remedies.
In sum, prior to the advent of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure in 1938, the procedures for obtaining relief from a judg-
ment were varied, complex, and confusing. In both appellate and
district courts, the term rule generally held sway, subject to the
exceptions for reserved power in the rendering court and clerical
errors. But a litigant could obtain relief through the ancillary
remedies (or motions based on them) developed by common law
and equity courts. In addition, he could bring an independent
action in equity to restrain the effects of a judgment against him.
C. Replacement of the Term Rule
The enactment of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in
1938 gave federal district courts new guidelines for reexamining
their own judgments. Rule 6(c) eliminated the significance of
terms of court when it provided that: "The expiration of a term
of court in no way affects the power of a court to do any
act . . . .40 To fill the resulting void, rule 60 permitted relief
3 Professors Wright and Miller explain:
If an independent action for relief from a judgment is brought in the court
that gave judgment, there is ancillary jurisdiction over the action despite the
absence of a federal question or of diversity of citizenship or of the requisite
amount of controversy. But, in theory at least, the action may be brought in
any court of competent jurisdiction. If it is brought in a court other than the
one that gave judgment, it seems that independent grounds of jurisdiction are
needed.
11 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 4, at 242-43 (footnotes omitted). Accord, 7 MooRE's
FEDERAL PRACTICE T, 60.38, at 642-47 (2d ed. 1978).
40 In its original form, rule 6(c) read:
(c) Unaffected by Expiration of Term. The period of time provided for the
doing of any act or the taking of any proceeding is not affected or limited by
the expiration of a term of court. The expiration of a term of court in no way
affects the power of a court to do any act or take any proceeding in any civil
action which has been pending before it.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(c) (1938). The Advisory Committee's Notes on the original rule 6(c)
stated: "This eliminates the difficulties caused by the expiration of terms of court." The
Advisory Committee made clear its intent to abolish the term rule in its Notes on the
Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments (May 1944): "The general rule that a court
[Vol. 64:704
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from final judgments for clerical errors and for a judgment based
on mistake or excusable neglect.41 Rule 60 clearly governed after
the expiration of the term, but some courts persisted in retaining
plenary power over their judgments during the term.4" Rule 6(c)
was amended in 1946 to end this practice. 43  At the same time,
loses jurisdiction to disturb its judgments, upon the expiration of the term at which they
were entered, had long been the classic device which ... gave finality to judgments....
Rule 6(c) abrogates that limit on judicial power." FED. R. Civ. P. 6(b) note (1946 Advisory
Comm. Note).
41 Rule 60(a) governed clerical errors, and rule 60(b) dealt with mistake or excusable
neglect. In its entirety rule 60 originally read:
(a) Clerical Mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders, or other parts of
the record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may be cor-
rected by the court at any time of its own initiative or on the motion of any
party and after such notice, if any, as the court orders.
(b) Mistake; Inadvertence; Surprise; Excusable Neglect. On motion the court,
upon such terms as are just, may relieve a party or his legal representative from
a judgment, order, or proceeding taken against him through his mistake, inad-
vertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. The motion shall be made within a
reasonable time, but in no case exceeding six months after such judgment, or-
der, or proceeding was taken. A motion under this subdivision does not affect
the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the
power of a court (1) to entertain an action to relieve a party from judgment,
order, or proceeding, or (2) to set aside within one year, as provided in Section
57 of the Judicial Code, U.S.C. Title 28, § 118, a judgment obtained against a
defendant not actually personally notified.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 60 (1938). Rule 60(b) applies in circumstances similar to the basis for a writ
of error coram nobis.
42 Boaz v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 146 F.2d 321, 322 (8th Cir. 1944); see Hill v. Hawes,
320 U.S. 520, 524 (1944); Bucy v. Nevada Constr. Co., 125 F.2d 213, 216-17 (9th Cir.
1942). The Advisory Committee Notes on the May 1944 preliminary draft of proposed
amendments discussed this confusion when they stated:
A question has arisen whether the equitable remedy of an ancillary bill of
review is available under these rules as they stand. Some members of the Ad-
visory Committee have had the impression the writ of error coram nobis, at
common law, and the bill of review in equity, were abolished by these rules,
and that the only procedures for correcting or obtaining relief from judgments
are those prescribed by these rules, including 60(b), except that an independent
action to set aside a judgment for such a cause as "extrinsic" fraud is preserved
by 60(b). It is probable that the rules leave this question of procedure in some
doubt and, if so, the doubt should be cleared up.
FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b) (Prelim. Draft 1944) note (Advisory Comm. Note).
4 As amended, rule 6(c) read:
(c) Unaffected by Expiration of Term. The period of time provided for the
doing of any act or the taking of any proceeding is not affected or limited by
the continued existence or expiration of a term of court. The continued existence or
expiration of a term of court in no way affects the power of a court to do any
act to take any proceeding in any civil action which has been pending before it.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(c) (1946) (emphasis indicates amendments).
This amendment also can help to clarify another area of confusion surrounding the
recall of appellate mandates. Rule 6(c) indicates that a court's power to deal with its judg-
ments derives from its power over "cases and controversies." See generally U.S. CONsT. art.
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rule 60 was completely revamped.44 It now includes more grounds
for relief from judgments and specifically states that the old ancil-
lary remedies used to obtain relief from judgments are
"abolished." Independent actions in equity, however, are expressly
preserved as a means of obtaining relief from a judgment.45 The
Advisory Committee Notes on rules 6 and 60 make it clear that
the Federal Rules delineate the only procedures under which a
district court can review its own judgments. 46
III, § 2. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure limit a district court's power to reconsider
cases by regulating the circumstances under which a district court can reopen its own cases.
Cf. FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b). See note 21 supra.
44 See FED. R. Civ. P. 60, quoted in note 3 supra.
45 Professor Moore describes the difference between a rule 60(b) motion and an inde-
pendent action in equity as follows:
[F]rom the ... principles of ancillary jurisdiction and service of process appli-
cable to an independent action brought in the federal court which rendered the
federal judgment from which relief is sought, it can be seen that the so-called
independent action is not, as a practical matter, very dissimilar in its procedural
aspects from the old ancillary common law and equitable remedies of audita
querela, coram nobis and bill of review, which ... were, along with others,
incorporated into grounds for relief by motion under amended 60(b).
There are, undoubtedly, some procedural differences between the 60(b)
motion and the independent action. But the essential difference does not lie in
pure procedure. It is this. The independent action affords relief where the
60(b) motion does not afford a plain, adequate and complete remedy; and,
what is perhaps more important, it affords relief, when warranted by estab-
lished equitable principles, although relief by motion under 60(b) is not obtain-
able because the time for making a motion has run.
7 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTIcE 60.38[3], at 650-52 (2d ed. 1978) (footnotes omitted).
46 The Advisory Committee Notes on the 1946 Amendments to FED. R. Civ. P. 6(b)
stated:
The further argument is that Rule 6(c) abolished the long standing device to
produce finality in judgments through expiration of the term, and since that
limitation on the jurisdiction of courts to set aside their own judgments has
been removed by Rule 6(c), some other limitation must be substituted or judg-
ments never can be said to be final.
... The Committee believes that the abolition by Rule 6(c) of the old rule
that a court's power over its judgments ends with the term, requires a substitute
limitation, and that unless Rule 6(b) is amended to prevent enlargement of the
times specified in Rules 50(b), 52(b), and 60(b), and the limitation as to Rule
59(b) and (d) is retained, no one can say when a judgment is final.
FED. R. Civ. P. 6(b) note (1946 Advisory Comm. Note).
Similarly, the Advisory Committee Notes on the 1946 Amendments to FED. R. Civ. P.
60(b) stated:
If these various amendments, including principally those to Rule 60(b), ac-
complish the purpose for which they are intended, the federal rules will deal
with the practice in every sort of case in which relief from final judgments is
asked, and prescribe the practice.
It should be noted that Rule 60(b) does not assume to define the substan-
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Because they apply only to district courts,47 the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure do not govern the procedures for reexamining
appellate mandates. In 1939 the Second Circuit decided to con-
tinue using the term rule rather than to follow the lead of rule
6(c) and judicially abrogate the term rule.48  Similarly, the Su-
preme Court in 1941 relied on a technical exception to the term
rule to allow the recall of an appellate mandate, 49 and the fol-
lowing year two more circuits reaffirmed the term rule.50 Thus
the term rule remained well-entrenched in appellate courts.
In 1944, however, the Supreme Court signalled the demise of
the term rule. In Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 5'
Hartford-Empire had obtained a decree holding its patent valid.
But the same decree also held that Hazel-Atlas had not infringed
the patent.52  On appeal, the Third Circuit reversed, finding that.
Hazel-Atlas had infringed the patent.53 Nine years later Hazel-
Atlas filed a petition in the court of appeals conclusively showing
that a trade journal article relied upon by that court, purportedly
written by a disinterested third party, had in fact been written by
an attorney for Hartford-Empire. The Third Circuit denied relief
from the judgment, holding that it had not relied heavily on
tive law as to the grounds for vacating judgments, but merely prescribes the
practice in proceedings to obtain relief.
FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b) note (1946 Advisory Comm. Note).
47 See note 4 supra. But cf. 2 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 6.09[2], at 1500.115-.116 (2d
ed. 1978) (although original rule 6(c) did not apply to appellate courts, 1948 amendments
could be taken to state "a principle for all courts").
48 Nachod v. Engineering & Research Corp., 108 F.2d 594 (2d Cir. 1939) (per curiam).
49 In Bernards v. Johnson, 314 U.S. 19 (1941), the Court held that a court of appeals
could recall its mandate when a motion to recall was made during the same term at which
the mandate was technically rendered. The court stated:
[Bly staying the issue of the mandate and retaining the cause until after the
subsequent term had opened, the court, in effect, did extend the term as re-
spects the instant case and ... it had power to take further steps in the cause
during the term in which the stay expired and the mandate issued.
Id. at 30. This case applied the traditional exception to the term rule of reserving control
over the judgment, thereby fictionally "extending" the term for a particular case. See note
18 supra.
50 Sun Oil Co. v. Burford, 130 F.2d 10 (5th Cir.) (mandate recalled during term in
reliance on continued power over mandates during term even though time for rehearing
expired), rev'd on other grounds, 319 U.S. 315 (1942); Stewart Die Casting Corp. v. NLRB,
129 F.2d 481 (7th Cir. 1942) (term rule observed after citing rule 6(c) and Nachod v.
Engineering & Research Corp., 108 F.2d 594 (2d Cir. 1939)).
51 322 U.S. 238 (1944), overruled on other grounds, Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 429
U.S. 17 (1976) (per curiam).
52 Hartford-Empire Co. v. Hazel-Atlas Glass Co., 39 F.2d 111 (W.D. Pa. 1930).
53 Hartford-Empire Co. v. Hazel-Atlas Glass Co., 59 F.2d 399 (3d Cir. 1932).
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the article, and that in any event, the court could not recall a
mandate once the term had expired.54
In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court reversed. The Court's
assault on the term rule began with the statement that "[firom the
beginning there has existed alongside the term rule a rule of
equity to the effect that under certain circumstances, one of which
is after-discovered fraud, relief will be granted against judgments
regardless of the term of their entry." 55 In holding that this case
warranted such relief, the Hazel-Atlas Court broke down many of
the old procedural rigidities that surrounded the term rule. The
Court drew upon various aspects of both independent actions in
equity and bills of review, while also rejecting other aspects. After
stating that it was granting relief on a bill of review, the Court
endorsed the practice of hearing bills of review in appellate courts
rather than sending such cases to district courts.5 6 But at the
same time, the Court dealt with the case as if it were an indepen-
dent action in equity; it cited cases involving independent ac-
tions 57 and granted relief on the basis of fraud, an appropriate
ground for an independent action but not for a bill of review.58
In addition, the Court abrogated the time constraint of laches-
which had applied to both independent actions and bills of
review 59-when invoking equity power to preserve "the integrity
5' Hartford-Empire Co. v. Hazel-Atlas Glass Co., 137 F.2d 764, 768-69 (3d Cir. 1943)
(citing Nachod v. Engineering & Research Corp., 108 F.2d 594 (2d Cir. 1939)).
55 322 U.S. at 244.
" The movant in Hazel-Atlas had originally brought a motion in the Third Circuit for
leave to file a bill of review in the district court. The Third Circuit granted Hazel-Atlas
leave to amend to seek the same relief directly in the appellate court, a procedure gener-
ally unavailable in a bill of review. See text at note 35 supra. But, for fear of violating the
term rule, the court of appeals balked at granting relief. Hartford-Empire Co. v. Hazel-
Atlas Glass Co., 137 F.2d 764, 769 (3d Cir. 1943). On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed,
rejecting the notion that a bill of review could not be granted by the appellate court after
the term ended. 322 U.S. at 248-49.
' The Court relied in part upon Pickford v. Talbott, 225 U.S. 651 (1912), Marshall v.
Holmes, 141 U.S. 589 (1891), United States v. Throckmorton, 98 U.S. 61 (1878) and
Marine Ins. Co. v. Hodgson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 557 (1813), each of which involved an
independent action for relief rather than a bill of review.
" Compare text at note 37 supra, with text at note 34 supra. But see Moore & Rogers,
supra note 15, at 677, 679-81; Fraser v. Doing, 130 F.2d 617, 620 & n.12 (D.C. Cir. 1942)
(dicta that bill of review may be used to correct fraud, citing other dicta to that effect).
19 See 11 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 4, § 2868, at 241 ("There is no time limit
on when an independent action may be brought, but the doctrine of laches is applicable
and undue delay may bar relief."); 7 MooR's FEDERAL PRACTICE 60.15, at 62 (2d ed.
1978) (bill of review may be time-barred by laches).
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of the judicial process." 0  The Supreme Court thus abrogated
the old procedural technicalities and fashioned a new category of
post-judgment relief-that of fraud on the court.6'
The Hazel-Atlas Court's analysis advanced the evolution of the
recall doctrine by articulating a balancing test that many courts
would follow. The Court ignored the individual requirements of
the ancillary remedies and the independent action, and looked in-
stead to the purposes and policies common to them all. The Court
stated:
Equitable relief against fraudulent judgments is not of
statutory creation. It is a judicially devised remedy fashioned to
relieve hardships which, from time to time, arise from a hard
and fast adherence to another court-made rule, the general
rule that judgments should not be disturbed after the term of
their entry has expired. Created to avert the evils of archaic
rigidity, this equitable procedure has always been characterized
by flexibility which enables it to meet new situations which de-
mand equitable intervention, and to accord all the relief neces-
sary to correct the particular injustices involved in these situa-
tions. 62
The common law and equity courts corrected "particular injus-
tices" with particular devices-the ancillary remedies. In contrast
to the clumsy and indirect approach to granting relief, the Hazel-
Atlas analysis is simple-a balancing between two court-made doc-
trines. The term rule holds sway except in extreme cases where
adherence to the rule would result in "particular injustices."
Equitable principles then allow the court to avoid the harshest re-
sults of the rule.
The term rule, with all its bag and baggage, abruptly disap-
peared in 1948 when Congress revised the Judicial Code. Section
" 322 U.S. at 246. The Court stated: "But even if Hazel did not exercise the highest
degree of diligence, Hartford's fraud cannot be condoned for that reason alone .... Surely
it cannot be that preservation of the integrity of the judicial process must always wait upon
the diligence of litigants." Id. This statement also rejects the equitable doctrine of "clean
hands" in the context of a fraud on a court.
61 This hybrid remedy has since outgrown its historical antecedents to become a pillar
of the recall doctrine. Litigants no longer need to bring bills of review or independent
action to obtain relief when there has been a fraud on an appellate court. Courts will grant
relief when a litigant brings a motion to recall the mandate. See Cord v. Smith, 370 F.2d
418, 423 (9th Cir. 1966) (dicta); Root Ref. Co. v. Universal Oil Prods. Co., 169 F.2d 514,
521-22 (3d Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 912 (1949). See also Greater Boston Television
Corp. v. FCC, 463 F.2d 268, 278 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (dicta), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972);
16 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 4, § 3938, at 288-89.
62 322 U.S. at 248.
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452 of the Code tracks the language of Federal Rule of Civil Pro-
cedure 6(c) 63 and provides: "The continued existence or expira-
tion of a term of court in no way affects the power of the court to
do any act or take any proceeding." 64  Section 452 applies to all
courts, including appellate courts.65  Although the Judicial Code
abolished the term rule, it did not substitute any procedures for
attaining finality of judgments.66
D. Development of Recall Doctrine in Appellate Courts
Section 452 provided the last ingredient needed to complete
the evolution of the recall doctrine. After an initial period of var-
ied reactions,6 7 the courts of appeals developed a more consistent
approach to recalls. An alternative holding by the Sixth Circuit in
Hines v. Royal Indemnity Co., 68 an intellectual offspring of Hazel-
Atlas, crystallized the current doctrine of recall of mandates. In
Hines, the petitioner filed a rule 60(b) motion in the court of ap-
peals requesting a reversal of the earlier judgment. The court first
held that since the appellant alleged only that the court had made
an error of law, the motion amounted to no more than "a petition
for rehearing under a different name."69  Being untimely under
Court Rule 22, the motion was denied.
As an alternative ground, the Hines court also looked to
Court Rule 24(a)-"A mandate once issued will not be recalled
63 See note 43 and accompanying text supra.
64 28 U.S.C. § 452 (1976).
65 The Code provides in relevant part:
As used in this title:
The term "court of the United States" includes the Supreme Court of the
United States, courts of appeals, district courts constituted by chapter 5 of this
title ....
Id. at § 451.
66 See United States v. Ohio Power Co., 353 U.S. 98, 103 (1957) (dissenting opinion,
Harlan, J.) ("The effect of § 452 was to leave the federal courts untrammeled in establish-
ing their own rules of finality. But the history of § 452 indicates that the courts were to
have no power to re-examine their judgments otherwise than in accordance with their
established rules or statutes.").
6' The Second Circuit interpreted abolition of the term rule to mean that they now
held enough control over their mandate to "change it as we think the situation demands."
National Comics Publs., Inc. v. Fawcett Publs., Inc., 198 F.2d 927, 927 (2d Cir. 1952). At
the other extreme, the Sixth Circuit at first missed the importance of § 452 and clung to
the term rule. See Watson v. Gallagher, 202 F.2d 641 (6th Cir. 1953), overruled by Hines v.
Royal Indem. Co., 253 F.2d 111, 113 (6th Cir. 1958). See also 14 CYCLOPEDIA OF FEDERAL
PROCEDURE §§ 69.12-15 (3d ed. 1952) (1952 compilation of cases fails to mention § 452).
68 253 F.2d 111 (6th Cir. 1958).
69 Id. at 113-14.
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except by order of the court for good cause shown." 70  To consti-
tute "good cause" the petitioner had to show "exceptional cir-
cumstances ... sufficient to override the strong public policy that
there should be an end to a case in litigation."71  Petitioner failed
to make such a showing.
This alternative holding in Hines contains the heart of the
current doctrine of recall of mandates. Whether speaking in terms
of "good cause," 72 "special circumstances," 73 or "prevent[ing] in-
justice,"74 courts analyze whether the petitioner has demonstrated
some reason special enough to override the policy of finality. Be-
cause of the respect accorded to finality, most courts exercise their
power to recall sparingly. 75
In contrast to the stringent substantive requirements of the
recall doctrine, its procedural aspects are simple. The Federal
Rules of Appellate Procedure make no mention of recalls, 76 and
only two circuits have their own rules allowing recalls.77 Because
no specific provision controls the procedural aspects of recalling
mandates, relief must be sought by motion under the general re-
quirements of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 27.78 Rule
27 (a) allows "any party" to file a "response in opposition" to the
motion. 79  The rules of two circuits allow a single judge to con-
70 Id. at 114.
71 Id.
72 Aerojet-General Corp. v. American Arb. Ass'n, 478 F.2d 248, 254 (9th Cir. 1973);
Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 463 F.2d 268, 277 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
406 U.S. 950 (1972).
"' Alphin v. Henson, 552 F.2d 1033 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 823 (1977); Powers
v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 483 F.2d 963, 964 (1st Cir. 1973); Greater Boston Television
Corp. v. FCC, 463 F.2d 268, 277 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972); Collins
v. City of Wichita, 254 F.2d 837, 839 (10th Cir. 1958).
74 5TH CIR. R. 15; 8TH CIR. R. 18. See Alphin v. Henson, 552 F.2d 1033, 1035
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 823 (1977); Aerojet-General Corp. v. American Arb. Ass'n,
478 F.2d 248, 254 (9th Cir. 1973); Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 463 F.2d 268,
277 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972); cf. Riha v. IT&T Corp., 533 F.2d
1053, 1055 (8th Cir. 1976) (time set by district court for interest to start running not
sufficiently unjust to lead to a recall).
,5 See Powers v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 483 F.2d 963, 964 (1st Cir. 1973); Greater
Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 463 F.2d 268, 277 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S.
950 (1972); Estate of Iverson v. Commissioner, 257 F.2d 408, 409 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
358 U.S. 893 (1958).
,' See note 7 and accompanying text supra.
" See note 9 and accompanying text supra.
" 9 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 241.02[4) (2d ed. 1975).
79 FED. R. App. P. 27(a).
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sider the motion; 80 in another circuit the judges who heard the
appeal consider the motion.8' Although rule 27 contains no time
limitation on motions, many courts attach great weight to the
timeliness of the motion.82
The courts' treatment of recalls involves a case-by-case balanc-
ing of the desirability of a just result against the policy of final-
ity. 83  Through direct consideration of the conflicting policies, the
courts achieve substantially the same results that were once
achieved indirectly through-or in spite of 84 -the rigid term rule
and its exceptions.8 "  Although emphasizing the proper policies,
such analysis consists of little more than the recitation of amor-
phous catchwords. Since a court can recall its mandate whenever
it believes that a petitioner has demonstrated sufficient "good
cause" or injustice, the limits on the doctrine lie solely in the
court's discretion. Such a vague test gives a court great freedom to
correct injustices, but it also results in uncertainty and unevenness
of application.8 6  In an effort to promote uniformity, simplicity,
and theoretical soundness of application, this Note suggests some
reforms of the current doctrine of recalls.
80 See 6TH CIR. R. 8(b); 8TH CIR. R. 2(c).
"1 See 2D CIR. R. 27(c).
82 See, e.g., Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 463 F.2d 268, 276 (D.C. Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972) (timeliness of motion may affect court's decision)
(dicta); Cord v. Smith, 370 F.2d 418, 423 (9th Cir. 1966) (party requesting recall knew of
fraud before judgment rendered); Lee v. Terminal Transp. Co., 301 F.2d 234, 236 (7th
Cir. 1962) (motion to recall 29 months after mandate issued too late); Yanow v.
Weyerhaeuser S.S. Co., 274 F.2d 274, 284 (9th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 919 (1960)
(motion to recall for lack ofjurisdiction I I months after mandate issued too late; by decid-
ing case court implicitly decided it had jurisdiction). See generally 16 C. WRIGHT & A.
MILLER, supra note 4, § 3938, at 289-90; 24 VILL. L. REv. 157, 162-63 (1978). The require-
ment of timeliness as applied by the courts bears a striking similarity to the doctrine of
laches as it applied to the ancillary remedies and independent actions. See notes 21 & 59
supra.
83 See text accompanying note 62 supra.
84 See Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 245 (1944). The
Court stated: "[Wihatever form the relief has taken in particular cases, the net result in
every case has been the same: where the situation has required, the court has, in some
manner, devitalized the judgment even though the term at which it was entered had long
since passed away."
85 See notes 17-19 and accompanying text supra.
86 One court has found a mandate that is arguably unclear causes sufficient injustice to
require a recall. Aerojet-General Corp. v. American Arb. Ass'n, 478 F.2d 248, 254 (9th Cir.
1973). Another court has held that a change in the law causing opposite results in two suits
arising from the same accident "is not such an extraordinary circumstance which justifies
such relief." Collins v. City of Wichita, 254 F.2d 837, 839 (10th Cir. 1958).
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III
PROPOSED TREATMENT OF SPECIFIC RECALL PROBLEMS
Over the past forty years, the reasons for requesting recalls
have generally fallen within four broad categories. Each conflicts
with a different facet of the finality policy, so each will be
analyzed separately.
A. Clerical Errors
Motions styled as requests for recalls of appellate mandates
arise with great frequency over matters that do not go to the
merits of the lawsuit. The most common examples are clerical
mistakes, 87 questions of costs of appeal, 88 and questions concern-
ing interest on judgments. 9 Although these errors are adminis-
trative in nature and collateral to the main issues, they loom large
in the eyes of the litigants and may involve huge sums of money.
Whenever a litigant demonstrates that a clerical or administrative
error of oversight or omission arising during the appellate pro-
ceedings has caused him harm, the appellate court should
promptly correct the error.
Courts should grant recalls of mandates flawed by clerical er-
rors without balancing the conflicting policies embodied in the
general doctrine of recalls. The desire for correctness will always
be strong in this situation because the harm arises not from any
fault of the party, but from the type of error inherent in any
17 See, e.g., Kinnear-Weed Corp. v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 296 F.2d 215 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 890 (1961) (modifying district court judgment that had mistakenly
used the word "affirmed" when intent had been to say "modified").
" See, e.g., United States v. Certain Land, 420 F.2d 370 (2d Cir. 1969) (costs improperly
taxed against United States government); Technical Tape Corp. v. Minnesota Mining &
Mfg. Co., 249 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1957) (mandate recalled to reduce printing costs awarded
appellee); Samson Tire & Rubber Corp. v. Rogan, 140 F.2d 457 (9th Cir. 1943) (mandate
recalled to tax costs).
89 See, e.g., Riha v. IT&T Corp., 533 F.2d 1053 (8th Cir. 1976) (recall refused and
district court allowed to set proper amount of interest); Perkins v. Standard Oil Co., 487
F.2d 672 (9th Cir. 1973) (recall granted to include instruction on interest provision); Dick-
erson v. Continental Oil Co., 476 F.2d 635 (5th Cir. 1973) (recall granted and interest
awarded on assumption that district court was without power to award interest); Lee v.
Terminal Transp. Co., 301 F.2d 234 (7th Cir. 1962) (recall denied on request for interest
made 29 months after mandate issued); Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Bellanca Corp., 308
F.2d 757 (7th Cir. 1962) (untimely petition to recall to modify interest provision denied);
Chemical Bank & Trust Co. v. Prudence-Bonds Corp., 213 F.2d 443 (2d Cir. 1954) (recall
denied and district court held to have determined incorrectly date from which interest
computed).
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
humanly-operated system. In contrast, the justification for finality
will be weak in these circumstances. 90 A dispute is not fully re-
solved when the system malfunctions and creates an additional
conflict between the parties. Second, little justifiable reliance can
attach to any part of a judgment based on a clerical error because
reliance stems from the reasoning of the court, not from the form
of its pronouncements. Third, certainty in knowing that a simple,
needless error will stand uncorrected is more unsettling than un-
certainty over whether the lawsuit has ended. Finally, clerical er-
rors can be corrected in summary proceedings that consume vir-
tually no judicial resources. In this situation, then, a balancing of
the policies is unnecessary because the policy considerations in
favor of recall should always prevail. To undertake an unneces-
sary balancing of policies might blur important distinctions and
result in erratic decision making.91
The term rule had a special exception for correction of cleri-
cal errors; 92 likewise, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure has a
special rule for clerical errors.93  The Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure should also have a special rule. A provision similar to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(a) would allow an appellate
court to grant relief to a litigant aggrieved because of an adminis-
trative error without requiring the parties and the court to make a
needless analysis of policies.94
B. Clarification of a Mandate
Parties commonly ask appellate courts to recall mandates in
order to clarify ambiguous language in the judgment. 95  This
90 See text accompanying notes 12-14 supra.
91 The confusion of the courts currently runs deep. Compare Riha v. IT&T Corp., 533
F.2d 1053, 1055 (8th Cir. 1976) (appellate court ordered remittitur but did not specify
when interest to begin to run; "[n]o injustice exists sufficient to lead us to recall and alter
[our] mandate.") and Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Bellanca Corp., 308 F.2d 757 (7th Cir.
1962) (petition to recall mandate to include post-judgment interest denied as untimely) and
Lee v. Terminal Transp. Co., 301 F.2d 234 (7th Cir. 1962) (plaintiff's motion in district
court to grant interest that appellate court failed to mention denied for lack of authority to
deviate from mandate; plaintiff's motion in appellate court to seek same relief denied as
untimely) with Perkins v. Standard Oil Co., 487 F.2d 672, 674 (9th Cir. 1973) (court granted
recall to include forgotten interest instructions in exercise of its power to "protect the
integrity of its own processes").
92 See text at note 19 supra.
93 See FED. R. Civ. P. 60(a), quoted in note 3 supra.
91 For a suggested incorporation of this proposal into the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure, see Appendix.
95 See, e.g., Reserve Mining Co. v. Lord, 529 F.2d 181, 183 (8th Cir. 1976); Reserve
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problem is easily corrected, but a recall of a mandate is not a
proper initial solution. In some limited situations a recall will be
appropriate; in. most cases, less drastic measures will suffice.
When parties disagree over the meaning of a mandate, the
proper general procedure is to petition for rehearing.9 6  During
the time when a rehearing is available, petitions to recall and
clarify a mandate are superfluous. But because of the nature of
ambiguous language, parties are often blind to interpretational
problems until they attempt to act on the mandate. By then, the
time for rehearing has usually passed.
When an ambiguity surfaces during further proceedings on
remand, a recall to clarify is inappropriate. The district court is in
a position to determine what the appellate court meant. Misinter-
pretation by the district court can be corrected on appeal.9 7
Should the district court blatantly misconstrue the mandate, the
aggrieved litigant can petition the appellate court for a writ of
mandamus to compel the district judge to properly carry out the
mandate.9 8 In any event, litigants should not be allowed to re-
Life Ins. Co. v. Pitfield MacKay & Co., 528 F.2d 120 (8th Cir. 1976); Aerojet-General
Corp. v. American Arb. Ass'n, 478 F.2d 248 (9th Cir. 1973); Meredith v. Fair, 306 F.2d
374 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 828 (1962); Penton v. United States, 264 F.2d 477 (6th
Cir. 1959); National Comics Pubis., Inc. v. Fawcett Pubis., Inc., 198 F.2d 927 (2d Cir.
1952).
'6 See note 5 supra.
97 The appellant could argue that the district court wrongly deviated from the higher
authority's mandate and thus violated the law of the case. See Briggs v. Pennsylvania R.R.,
334 U.S. 304 (1948); In re Sanford Fork & Tool Co., 160 U.S. 247, 255 (1895); Ex parte
Sibbald v. United States, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 488, 491 (1838); S.S. Kresge Co. v. Winget
Kickernick Co., 102 F.2d 740, 742 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 557 (1939).
"8 See United States v. United States Dist. Court, 334 U.S. 258, 264 (1947) (court of
appeals empowered to issue mandamus to compel lower court to carry out appellate man-
date). Cf. Reserve Mining Co. v. Lord, 529 F.2d 181 (8th Cir. 1976) (when district judge
willfully misconstrued mandate, appellate court recalled mandate and recused district
judge rather than issuing mandamus only).
The Supreme Court settled this area of law long ago in In re Sanford Fork & Tool
Co., 160 U.S. 247 (1895), when it stated:
When a case has been once decided by this court on appeal, and remanded
to the Circuit Court, whatever was before this court, and disposed of by its
decree, is considered as finally settled. The Circuit Court is bound by the de-
cree as the law of the case; and must carry it into execution, according to the
mandate. That court cannot vary it, or examine it for any other purpose than
execution; or give any other or further relief; or review it, even for apparent
error, upon any matter decided on appeal; or intermeddle with it, further than
to settle so much as has been remanded. ... If the Circuit Court mistakes or
misconstrues the decree of this court, and does not give full effect to the man-
date, its action may be controlled, either upon a new appeal ... or by a writ of
mandamus to execute the mandate of this court .... The opinion delivered by
this court ... may be consulted to ascertain what was intended by its mandate;
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turn to the appellate court for a clarification while a district court
is dealing with the case on remand. 99 Piecemeal review ought not
to be allowed under the guise of a "motion to recall." 100
Recalls for clarification are appropriate only where the am-
biguity in a mandate does not surface until after the completion
of remand proceedings or where there is no remand. 10' In such
cases, interpretation of the mandate is the only remaining issue.
Since a district judge's reading would often be appealed anyway,
direct recourse to the appellate court seems more expeditious.
Like clerical errors, ambiguities arise by oversight and can usually
be corrected quickly.' 02 There is of course a danger that parties
will use "clarification" recalls to seek a substantive change in the
mandate or to delay its execution, but such frivolous petitions
could be penalized by awarding damages and costs.' 0 3
and, either upon an application for a writ of mandamus, or upon a new appeal,
it is for this court to construe its own mandate, and to act accordingly.
Id. at 255-56.
9' See Vendo Co. v. Lektro-Vend Corp., 434 U.S. 425 (1978) (per curiam) (motion to
clarify judgment denied since judgment only a routine order directing that the decision of
Court be carried into effect, but option to file petition for mandamus left open).
1o See generally 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1292 (1976) (courts of appeals have jurisdiction to
hear appeals from final and specified interlocutory decisions of district courts).
101 Such a situation may arise when an appellate court, without remanding for further
proceedings, modifies the relief granted to a plaintiff and, as modified, affirms.
102 For a suggested incorporation of this proposal into the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure, see Appendix. As with clerical errors, the definition of "clarification" will de-
termine whether this proposal is workable. The term "clarification" can be stretched to
include requests for relief that do not really deal with ambiguous language. For instance, in
Penton v. United States, 264 F.2d 477 (6th Cir. 1959), a district court judge receiving a
case on remand sent a memorandum to the court of appeals asking for a clarification
because he was unable to reconcile the law as stated by the latter court with the facts
stipulated by the parties. The clear implication was that he believed that the court of ap-
peals made a mistake of law that should be corrected. The Sixth Circuit recognized that the
confusion lay with district court judge rather than their mandate and denied the petition.
Courts should guard against such attempts to use clarification as a ploy to obtain reconsid-
eration of a decision that is substantively wrong rather than merely the bearer of ambigu-
ous language or some other technical mistake. When a technical error other than an am-
biguity is characterized as a clarification problem, however, the problem is obviated because
both can be summarily corrected upon a proper motion. See, e.g., Gurley v. Lindsley, 466
F.2d 498 (5th Cir. 1972) (granting motion to clarify mandate which failed to indicate when
10% interest was to begin to accrue); Lauro v. United States, 163 F.2d 642 (2d Cir. 1947)
(granting motion to "interpret" whether mandate called for interest on judgment).
103 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1976). Compare also FED. R. App. P. 38 which provides: "If a court
of appeals shall determine that an appeal is frivolous, it may award just damages and single
or double costs to the appellee." Although rule 38 does not mention motions, the purpose
of the rule would be served by applying it in this situation. Cf NLRB v. Smith & Wesson
Co., 424 F.2d 1072 (1st Cir. 1970) (on petition to enforce board order, damages awarded
for frivolous argument in opposition to petition). See generally 9 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACrICE
201.08 (2d ed. 1975) (rules should be liberally construed).
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C. Fraud on an Appellate Court
A fraud on the judicial processes raises delicate problems of
vindicating the integrity of the court within the confines of an
adversary process. Here it is necessary to distinguish "fraud on
the court" from "fraud between the parties." 104 According to Pro-
fessor Moore's widely accepted definition, "fraud on the court" is
that species of fraud which does or attempts to, defile the court
itself, or is a fraud perpetrated by officers of the court so that
the judicial machinery can not perform in the usual manner its
impartial task of adjuding [sic] cases that are presented for ad-
judication. Fraud inter partes, without more, should not be a
fraud upon the court .... 105
Fraud between the parties or a fraud on a district court should be
handled by the district courts under rule 60(b). 10 6  A fraud per-
petrated solely on an appellate court (for example by corruption
of an appellate judge 107 or by an attorney's improper conduct on
appeal 108) should be handled through recall of the appellate
mandate.
Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co. 109 set forth the
principle that allegations of a fraud on an appellate court must be
104 For district courts, such a distinction must be drawn to make sense out of the struc-
ture of rule 60(b). The rule authorizes district courts to handle fraudulent judgments in
three ways: the court that rendered a judgment may set it aside within one year because of
the fraud, misrepresentation, or misconduct of an adverse party; any court may, subject to
a time limitation of Iaches, entertain an independent action in equity to set aside a fraudu-
lently obtained judgment; and a court may at any time "set aside a judgment for fraud on
the court." FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b), quoted in note 3 supra. See generally Lockwood v. Bowles,
46 F.R.D. 625, 628-32 (D.D.C. 1969); 7 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 60.33, at 504-06 (2d
ed. 1978); 11 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 4, § 2870, at 253.
The repetition and overlap of antifraud procedures in rule 60(b) is symptomatic of the
problems that a fraud on the court entails. A stain on the judicial system cannot be con-
doned. Yet just how to define a "fraud on the court" is unclear (see, e.g., Moore & Rogers,
supra note 15, at 692 n.266), as is how, when, and by whom the stain should be removed.
105 7 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 60.33, at 515 (2d ed. 1978). See 11 C. WRIGHT & A.
MILLER, supra note 4, § 2870, at 252.
10' See note 104 supra.
107 See, e.g., Root Ref. Co. v. Universal Oil Prods. Co., 169 F.2d 514 (3d Cir. 1948), cert.
denied, 335 U.S. 912 (1949) (attorney improperly influenced judge in attempt to secure
favorable judicial action).
101 See, e.g., Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238 (1944), discussed
in notes 51-62 and accompanying text supra. The appellate court in Hazel-Atlas relied on a
fraudulent trade journal article written by Hartford-Empire's attorney, an insignificant part
of the record in the trial court.
109 322 U.S. 238 (1944), discussed in notes 51-62 and accompanying text supra.
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ruled upon by the defrauded court."0  This principle presents
thorny practical problems. Appellate courts are ill-equipped to
hear issues of fact, even "undisputed" facts."' That it was the
victim of a fraud does not give the appellate tribunal any special
information that cannot be obtained by another tribunal. Indeed,
the court should decline to decide the factual matters because it
now has an interest in the dispute 2 -it runs the danger of
stepping into a prosecutorial role." 3
These problems are not insoluble, however. When faced with
a petition to recall a mandate for fraud upon an appellate court,
that court could refer the case to a district court for all factual
determinations." 4  Upon receipt of the district court's findings of
110 322 U.S. at 247-50. In Hazel-Atlas itself, the Court declined to decide whether or not
the Third Circuit should have remanded had the factual allegations in the affidavits been
disputed. 322 U.S. at 249-50 n.5. Two years later the Supreme Court stated: "The power
to unearth such a fraud is the power to unearth it effectively. Accordingly, a federal court
may bring before it by appropriate means all those who may be affected by the outcome of
its investigation." Universal Oil Co. v. Root Ref. Co., 328 U.S. 575, 580 (1946). On remand
the court of appeals followed this language to the hilt by holding a ten day trial before a
three-judge panel in the appellate courthouse without the aid of a master. Root Ref. Co. v.
Universal Oil Prods. Co., 169 F.2d 514, 519-21 (3d Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 912
(1949). This procedure has been cited with approval by Professor Moore (7 MooRE's FED-
ERAL PRACTICE 60.33, at 507-08 (2d ed. 1978)), and Professors Wright and Miller (11 C.
WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 4, § 2870, at 251-52).
"I The Hazel-Atlas Court glossed over underlying factual issues by labelling the facts
"undisputed." 322 U.S. at 247. The dissenters, however, raised significant doubts about the
propriety of the movant's conduct and would have remanded for trial (322 U.S. at 262-71),
and the Third Circuit had held that the fraudulent article was not the basis of their prior
decision and therefore the allegations of fraud were without merit (Hartford-Empire Co. v.
Hazel-Atlas Glass Co., 137 F.2d 764, 769 (3d Cir. 1943)).
112 The court has an interest both in vindicating itself when its integrity has been sullied
through unscrupulous acts by members of the bench and bar and in protecting against
groundless allegations of such acts. The protection of this interest will involve powerful
emotions that may affect the decisionmaking process in even the fairest of minds. Such a
conflict should be avoided if possible.
113 That a fraud on a district court places the trial judge hearing a rule 60(b) motion in
the same uncomfortable position does not argue against avoidance of factfinding by appel-
late courts in fraud cases. A resouceful district court judge could find a way to avert the
conflict such as by utilizing a master.
114 See, e.g., Kinnear-Weed Corp. v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 403 F.2d 437 (5th Cir.
1968) (en banc). Kinnear urged that the trial judge be disqualified because of his substan-
tial financial ties to Humble Oil and further alleged that Humble's failure to disclose those
financial ties to the petitioner and to the Fifth Circuit on appeal constituted a fraud on the
latter court. See Kinnear-Weed Corp. v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 441 F.2d 631, 633, 636
(5th Cir. 1971). Although both parties desired to stand upon the record and have the court
of appeals decide the issue (403 F.2d at 444 (dissenting opinion, Dyer, J.)), the Fifth Circuit
felt that public policy required a complete airing of the issue. It stated:
[T]he interests of justice require that there be a judicial factual hearing and
determination of the charges .... Obviously this Court is not equipped for this
sort of determination, either acting en banc, by a panel, or by one Judge acting
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fact, the appellate court could then grant any appropriate re-
lief.115
D. Change in Law After Appellate Decision
Perhaps the most troublesome recall problems arise when the
substantive law changes shortly after an appellate court has
reached its decision. The losing litigant desires to have the new
principle of law applied to his case, but the general rule of finality
prevents reformation of mandates. Only under special cir-
cumstances can a mandate be reformed to make it consistent with
a subsequent change in law. Litigants often use a motion for recall
as a vehicle for seeking such relief.' 16  In most cases, however, a
recall would be improper because other means of obtaining relief
are usually available and should be used rather than the extraor-
dinary remedy of recall. In this context, recalls should be used
only in unique instances that cannot be remedied by less drastic
measures.
as an independent Special Master. This is the task for which a District Court is
ideally suited. Consequently, we treat this extraordinary petition as one request-
ing leave of this Court to proceed with a motion under F.R. Civ. P. 60(b) or, as
permitted in Rule 60(b), an "independent action." ... The issues may encom-
pass the charges showing fraud upon this Court. And to the extent that
Petitioner undertakes to prove such facts as distinguished from fraud on the
District Court ... the District Court shall hear and determine and make find-
ings of fact and conclusions of law on that feature of the case. After which, by
appropriate steps, we can determine whether and to what extent these are to be
treated as the action of (i) a District Court serving as a Special Master, requiring
our approval prior to their effectiveness, or (ii) simply as a District Court in
which event such findings and conclusions would be reviewed as a part of any
appeal.
403 F.2d at 442. The district court found that no fraud had been perpetrated on either
court, (Kinnear-Weed Corp. v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co. 324 F. Supp. 1371 (S.D. Tex.
1969)), and the Fifth Circuit affirmed on appeal (Kinnear-Weed Corp. v. Humble Oil &
Ref. Co., 441 F.2d 631 (5th Cir. 1971)).
When no factual issues are presented, such a factual determination is, of course, un-
necessary. But in matters involving such intricate and delicate considerations, it seems bet-
ter to err on the side of too much rather than too little thoroughness.
115 This procedure does not conflict with Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 429 U.S. 17
(1976) (per curiam). In that case the Court held that litigants desiring to open a judgment
that had been affirmed on appeal need not apply for leave of the appellate court to file a
rule 60(b) motion in district court. The case involved an allegation of a fraud on the court
(misconduct by an attorney), but the defrauded court was the district court, not the appel-
late court. A fraud on the district court is cognizable under rule 60(b); a fraud on the
appellate court is not. Therefore a litigant victimized by a fraud on an appellate court must
return to that court not for leave to file a motion in the district court, but for his remedy.
116 See, e.g., Verilli v. City of Concord, 557 F.2d 664 (9th Cir. 1977); In re Union Na-
cional de Trabajadores, 527 F.2d 602 (1st Cir. 1975); Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co. v.
T.L. James & Co., 256 F.2d 344 (5th Cir. 1958).
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One primary factor which determines whether a subsequent
change in law will override an appellate decision is the procedural
posture of the case.
1. Cases sub Judice
So long as the case remains subjudice, the court currently con-
sidering the case should apply the most recent controlling deci-
sion. For instance, imagine a case now in the district court on
remand following an appellate decision clearly stating the rule of
law. If, before the district court completes its disposition of the
case, the Supreme Court hands down a contrary rule of law, the
district court should apply the new controlling authority; 117 under
a traditional exception to the law of the case doctrine, it is not
bound to follow the prior appellate mandate.11 8 Because the ap-
pellate court must also follow the new controlling authority, leave
from the appellate court to deviate from the mandate is unneces-
sary.119 Thus a motion to recall would be unnecessary. 2 °
117 See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr, 383 F.2d 166, 178 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
390 U.S. 956 (1968); Page v. St. Louis Sw. Ry., 349 F.2d 820, 821 (5th Cir. 1965). See also
1B MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.404[10], at 575-76 (2d ed. 1974 & Supp. 1978-79);
Vestal, Law of the Case: Single-Suit Preclusion, 1967 UTAH L. REv. 1, 6-10.
118 1B MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.404 [10], at 575-76 (2d ed. 1974).
119 Luminous Unit Co. v. Freeman-Sweet Co., 3 F.2d 577, 580 (7th Cir. 1924); Bailey v.
Ryan Stevedoring Co., 443 F. Supp. 899, 901 (M.D. La. 1978). Cf. Standard Oil Co. v.
United States, 429 U.S. 17 (1976) (per curiam) (abolishing appellate leave requirements in
cases involving rule 60(b) motions), discussed in note 115 supra and text accompanying notes
131-36 infra. But cf. 16 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 4, § 3938, at 279-81 (viewing
motion to recall as useful in avoiding "error that would vitiate the proceedings" because
viability of prior mandate is questioned).
Should the district court refuse to deviate from the appellate mandate, the litigant
should appeal that decision and ask the appellate court to align itself with the new control-
ling authority. For instance, in Verilli v. City of Concord, 557 F.2d 664 (9th Cir. 1977), a
statute awarding attorneys' fees became law after the oral arguments in the appellate court,
but before filing of the opinion. A subsequent decision held that the statute applied to all
cases pending on the date the statute became law. The district court refused to grant the
attorneys' fees because to do so would change the appellate mandate. On appeal, the Ninth
Circuit overruled its earlier mandate, holding that the statute should be applied to Verilli.
The court spoke in terms of recalling its prior mandate and used the balancing approach
of the type suggested in Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238
(1944), discussed in text at note 62 supra, but that discussion appears unnecessary since it
merely reversed its earlier ruling on appeal.
120 Using recall doctrine and terminology merely confuses the true issues. An example
of such needless confusion is American Iron & Steel Inst. v. EPA, 560 F.2d 589 (3d Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 914 (1978). In that case, the American Iron & Steel Institute
obtained review of the Environmental Protection Agency's water pollution regulations. The
Third Circuit had held, inter alia, that a federal statute required the EPA to promulgate
"ranges" of permissible effluent discharge as guidelines for the industry. American Iron &
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2. After Final Disposition
The principles of res judicata normally prevent a party from
attacking a valid and final judgment. 121  "Alleged erroneous rul-
ings of law are generally not held to be sufficiently unconscion-
able to justify reopening a judgment not void when issued." 122
Nor, in the usual case, will a subsequent change in the applicable
law vitiate a judgment. 23  But in some instances substantial injus-
tice results when a mandate based on an outmoded law binds a
party. Many litigants have requested recall of a mandate as a
means to avoid the binding effect of an inequitable judgment. 124
Where other modes of relief can correct these injustices parties
need not resort to recalls.
Relitigation of the dispute provides the primary means for
avoiding the binding effect of a judgment. Under section 70 of
the Restatement of Judgments, a determination of a question of
Steel Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d 1027 (3d Cir. 1975). In deciding a similar case from another
circuit, the Supreme Court approved single-number guidelines, leaving the law in the
Third Circuit out of step with that of the rest of the country. The EPA, meanwhile, had
not yet completed its efforts on remand from the Third Circuit to promulgate the range
guidelines. It then -filed a petition asking the Third Circuit to recall and modify the man-
date to prevent deviation from the Supreme Court's order and the occurrence of inconsis-
tent EPA operating guidelines among the various circuits. Id. at 598. The Third Circuit
recalled and modified its mandate after a long and intricate opinion.
These arduous recall proceedings were unnecessary. The EPA itself could have simply
fallen into line with the Supreme Court without all this bother. The Third Circuit recog-
nized that the case remained sub judice. They stated that their earlier mandate, "at least
prior to completion by the agency of the tasks ordered by this panel, cannot be said to
have constituted a final adjudication of the dispute concerning the validity of the challenged
regulations." Id. at 599. Thus the EPA could have foregone the recall petition and taken
advantage of the exception to law of the case doctrine just as any lower court could ignore
a court of appeals decision in favor of an intervening Supreme Court decision.
The obvious factor complicating this case is the difference in the relationship between a
trial court and appellate court and the relationship between agency and reviewing court.
See generally K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT § 8.10, at 209 (3d ed. 1972). The rela-
tions in this context, however, seem sufficiently analogous that the same basic principles
should apply.
'1 See Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 597 (1948). See generally 1B MooRE's FED-
ERAL PRAc-TiE 0.405[1] (2d ed. 1974).
121 Powers v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 483 F.2d 963, 964 (Ist Cir. 1973). See Estate of
Iverson v. Commissioner, 257 F.2d 408 (8th Cir. 1958); Hines v. Royal Indem. Co., 253
F.2d 111, 113-14 (6th Cir. 1958). See generally Note, Federal Rule 60(b): Finalty of Civil Judg-
ments v. Self-Correction by District Court of Judicial Error of Law, 43 NOTRE DAME LAW. 98
(1967).
123 See RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 70 (1942); 1B MooRE'S FEDERAL PRA TICE 0.448,
at 4233-35 (2d ed. 1974). But see United States v. Komisar, 420 F.2d 377 (6th Cir. 1966)
(mem.).
14 See, e.g., Powers v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 483 F.2d 963 (lst Cir. 1973); Estate of
Iverson v. Commissioner, 257 F.2d 408 (8th Cir. 1958).
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law binds the parties only "where both causes of action arose out
of the same subject matter or transaction; and in any event it is
not conclusive if injustice would result." 125 The recently pro-
posed revision of the Restatement of Judgments substantially
amplifies this theme. Proposed sections 61.2 and 68.1 allow reliti-
gation of a claim or an issue settled in a prior action where claim
or issue preclusion would result in unjust or inequitable adminis-
tration of the law. 126  This framework permits adequate relief
from an outmoded or erroneous ruling of law in most, but not all,
situations. The statute of limitations may have run on some liti-
gants. Others may simply be unable to afford the time and ex-
pense of a new trial.
Another way to avoid the binding effect of judgments ob-
viates most of these problems. Courts of equity historically re-
125 RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 70 (1942). The type of injustice alluded to in § 70
occurs when a person engaged in a continuing course of conduct obtains a judgment re-
garding his conduct. For instance, an importer may litigate whether certain goods fall
within a duty-free classification. Should subsequent litigation between the regulatory body
and other importers result in an opposite rule of law, the first importer would possess
either a substantial advantage or disadvantage vis-a-vis his competitors if he and the agency
are bound by the prior judgment. To prevent such unequal and unfair results, the parties
should be able to relitigate the issue after the change in law. See United States v. Stone &
Downer Co., 274 U.S. 225 (1927).
126 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 61.2 (Tent. Draft No. 1 1973) provides in
relevant part:
(1) When any of the following circumstances exists, the general rule of
§ 61 does not apply to extinguish the claim, and part or all of the claim subsists
as a possible basis for a second action by the plaintiff against the defendant:
(d) The judgment in the first action was plainly inconsistent with the
fair and equitable implementation of a statutory or constitutional scheme,
or it is the sense of the scheme that the plaintiff should be permitted to
split his claim; or
(f) It is clearly and convincingly shown that the policies favoring pre-
clusion of a second action are overcome for an extraordinary reason, such
as the apparent invalidity of a continuing restraint or condition having a
vital relation to personal liberty or the failure of the prior litigation to yield
a coherent disposition of the controversy.
Similarly, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 68.1 (Tent Draft No. 4 1977) states in
pertinent part:
Although an issue is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final
judgment, and the determination is essential to the judgment, relitigation of the
issue in a subsequent action between the parties is not precluded in the follow-
ing circumstances: ... (b) The issue is one of law and ... (ii) a new determina-
tion is warranted in order to take account of an intervening change in the
applicable legal context or otherwise to avoid inequitable administrations of the
laws.
APPELLATE MANDATES
tained power to modify decrees when changed circumstances of
law or fact rendered injunctive relief inequitable. 127  Codified in
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(5), this relief is available
upon motion. 12 8  It thus requires no independent claim or juris-
dictional basis.
Rule 60(b)(5), however, is not a cure-all. It applies only to
judgments with "prospective effect as contrasted with those that
offer a present remedy for a past wrong." 129  Further, it applies
only to district court judgments and not to appellate mandates. If
an appellate court has ruled upon the case, the district court is
bound by that ruling as the law of the case. Once the decision has
become final, no exception to law of the case doctrine allows a
district court to reassert jurisdiction to modify the decision. But in
this context, a modified form of recall developed to allow litigants
to take advantage of the relief available under rule 60(b) without
flouting the mandate of the appellate court. The litigant first
petitioned the appellate court for leave to file a rule 60(b) motion
in the lower court. If the appellate court found some merit in the
petition, it recalled its mandate pending the outcome in the dis-
trict court.'30
In Standard Oil Co. v. United States,' 3 ' the Supreme Court
called the appellate leave requirement an "unnecessary and unde-
sirable clog on the proceedings," 132 and abolished it.13 3  The
127 See System Fed'n v. Wright, 364 U.S. 642, 646-48 (1960); United States v. Swift &
Co., 286 U.S. 106, 114 (1931); Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S.
(18 How.) 421, 431-32 (1855).
"IS FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b), quoted in note 3 supra. See 7 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE
60.26[4], at 327-30 (2d ed. 1978); 11 C. WmGrr & A. MILLER, supra note 4, § 2863, at
204.
129 11 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 4, § 2863, at 205 (footnote omitted). See Ryan
v. United States Lines Co., 303 F.2d 430, 434 (2d Cir. 1962); 7 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE
60.26[4), at 327, 333 (2d ed. 1975), See generally Note, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b):
Standards for Relief from Judgments Due to Changes in Law, 43 U. CHI. L. REv. 646, 652-56
(1976).
130 See, e.g., Tribble v. Bruin, 279 F.2d 424 (4th Cir. 1960), overruled, Standard Oil Co. v.
United States, 429 U.S. 17, 18 (1976) (per curiam). For pre-rule practice, see In re Potts,
166 U.S. 263 (1897).
131 429 U.S. 17 (1976) (per curiam).
132 Id. at 19 (quoting Wilkin v. Sunbeam Corp., 405 F.2d 165, 166 (10th Cir. 1968)).
133 An earlier attempt to eliminate the appellate leave requirement failed. In October
1955 the Advisory Committee on Rules for Civil Procedure proposed to amend rule 60(b)
by inserting the following after the third sentence: "Leave to make the motion need not be
obtained from any appellate court except during such time as an appeal from the judg-
ment is actually pending before such court." ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES FOR CIVIL
PROCEDURE, REPORT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR THE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS 61 (1955). The Committee Note stated:
1979]
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Court reasoned that the district court does not flout the appellate
mandate by hearing the motion because the mandate relates only
to the record and not to possible later events. Finality is impaired
no more here than in any rule 60(b) proceeding. Finally, it found
district courts to be just as qualified as appellate courts to distin-
guish meritorious from frivolous rule 60(b) motions. 13 4  Thus,
rule 60(b) relief 135 from a district court judgment indirectly pro-
vides all necessary relief from an appellate decision mandating an
outmoded rule of law. In this situation, the various forms of relief
available under rule 60(b) 136 render appellate recalls obsolete.
CONCLUSION
Courts have long been plagued by the question of when to
grant post-judgment relief. The common law and equity courts
developed the term rule which strongly favored finality of judg-
ments. It permitted correction of errors that were either glaring
or incidental; 137 the vast middle range of errors were left un-
touched. Dissatisfied with its workings in particular cases, courts
developed various ancillary remedies to avoid the term rule.138
The amendment ... deals with the requirement of leave from an appellate
court to reopen a judgment which had been settled on appeal. Some courts
have laid down such a requirement, though the carefully detailed procedure of
this rule included none .... Such a requirement of leave from the appellate
court is a useless and delaying formalism. An appellate court cannot know
whether the requirements for reopening a case under the rule are actually met
without a full record which must obviously be made in the district court. The
amendment expressly negatives any such barren requirement.
Id. at 62. In a separate statement, Professor Moore argued against adoption of the pro-
posal, saying:
Proposed revision of Rule ... 60(b) is, in my opinion, unsound in principal
because the proposed amendment
unnecessarily undermines the finality of judgments by rejecting the rule stated
in Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, that leave of an
appellate court is necessary before the trial court may proceed with a motion
for relief from a judgment entered in accordance with the appellate court's
mandate.
Id. at 8. Professor Moore's view prevailed and the amendment was never adopted. For an
amplification of Professor Moore's view, see 7 MooREs'S FEDERAL PRtAcricE § 60.30[2], at
425-29 & n.27 (2d ed. 1975).
131 429 U.S. at 18-19.
1" The court did not limit their holding to the specific clause of rule 60(b) under con-
sideration. They spoke of all of the various types of rule 60(b) motions.
116 Clause (6) of rule 60(b) opens wide the door for relief because it allows the equiva-
lent of a recall by the district court for "any other reason [not already listed in the rule]
justifying relief from the operation of a judgment." FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b).
13' See notes 15-19 and accompanying text supra.
138 See notes 20-39 and accompanying text supra.
732
APPELLATE MANDATES
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure collected this bewildering
array of devices and molded them into one eminently workable
rule for the district courts. 139 Rule 60 simplified post-judgment
proceedings at the district court level, but set appellate courts
adrift by offering them no guidance. Following the Supreme
Court's lead ir Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., the
courts of appeals ignored the procedural maze of the past and
developed a new, flexible doctrine: appellate mandates would not
be altered except "for good cause." 14 0 Under this recall doctrine,
appellate courts weigh the interests of finality and correctness in
determining whether to grant relief in each individual case. 14 1
Although this appellate procedure focuses on the proper con-
siderations, it is time-consuming, confusing and unpredictable.
The procedures for obtaining post-judgment relief in appellate
courts should be simplified and unified. To this end, district and
appellate courts should work together and use the same proce-
dures to grant any appropriate post-judgment relief. Circuit
courts are free to establish their own recall procedures and could
adopt these suggested reforms as either common law doctrine or
local court rule. Alternatively, such an integration of procedures
can easily be accomplished by adding three provisions to Federal
Rule of Appellate Procedure 41, which deals with issuance and
stay of mandates.' 42 The Appendix sets forth a proposal for
drafting such provisions. The first provision authorizes appellate
courts to grant summary corrections of minor errors such as cleri-
cal errors and ambiguous language 43 in the same way that rule
60(a) authorizes such relief by district courts. The second provi-
sion authorizes appellate courts to take appropriate steps to rectify
the most major defects in its mandates-those that touch upon
the integrity of the courts' own processes.' 44 The third provision
covers all other cases. It establishes rule 60(b) as the basic proce-
dure for obtaining relief from any judgment, even a judgment
upon which an appellate court has ruled. The first five categories
of rule 60(b), though not specifically designed for appellate
courts, cover nearly every situation in which a need for a recall
139 See notes 40-46 and accompanying text supra.
140 See notes 67-75 and accompanying text supra.
141 See notes 51-82 and accompanying text supra.
I42 See FED. R. App. P. 41, quoted in note 6 supra.
141 See notes 87-103 and accompanying text supra.
144 See notes 104-15 and accompanying text supra.
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may arise. Rule 60(b)(6) can expand to include the rare cases that
do not fit into the first five categories.1 45  This procedure can
bridge the gap between the district and appellate courts and pro-
vide clear guidance to litigants and judges in all motions for post-
judgment relief.
David G. Seykora
14- The interplay between district and appellate courts under this proposal can be dem-
onstrated by working an actual case through the procedure. In Pierce v. Cook & Co., 518
F.2d 720 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1079 (1976), three lawsuits arising from the
same accident were removed from state court to federal court on the basis of diversity of
citizenship. One plaintiff succeeded in defeating removal by lack of complete diversity, thus
sending his case back to the state court. The federal court, applying the current state law,
granted summary judgment for the defendant solely on the basis of stare decisis. The
court of appeals affirmed. Three years later, the plaintiff who remained in the state court
persuaded the Oklahoma Supreme Court to overrule the prior decision that the federal
courts had relied upon. The two federal plaintiffs brought a rule 60(b) motion in the court
of appeals. Although recognizing the technical impropriety of an appellate court hearing a
rule 60(b) motion, the court decided to consider the motion because "the trial court could
well believe that it is without power to determine a legal question contrary to the decision
of the court of appeals." Id. at 722. The court granted relief under rule 60(b)(6) by recall-
ing its judgment and remanding to the district court for further proceedings.
The proposal would have eliminated the confusion on the part of both the litigants
and the courts in Pierce over which court should hear the motion. The district court need
not have feared that it lacked power to hear the motion because the appellate court had
ruled upon the matter. Further, the district court would be empowered to hear the motion
even though the motion involved a change in law rather than a changed factual matter of
the type covered under the first five categories of rule 60(b).
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APPENDIX
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO
FEDERAL RuLE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 41
(c) Correction of Minor Errors. Clerical mistakes in opinions,
judgments, or mandates, or errors therein arising from oversight
or omission may be corrected by the court at any time of its own
initiative or on motion of any party and after such notice, if any,
as the court orders. On motion, the court may clarify any am-
biguities of the language used in its mandate unless another court
has jurisdiction over and is conducting further proceedings in the
same action, in which case the latter court may clarify the am-
biguous language.
(d) Fraud on an Appellate Court. On motion or of its own initia-
tive, an appellate court shall reexamine any judgment that may
have been obtained through a fraud on that court. After resolu-
tion of any factual issues by an appropriate factfinder, the court
may recall its mandate and grant any and all relief it deems ap-
propriate.
(e) Recall of Mandate. Except as provided in (d), no mandate
may be recalled unless (i) the mandate works a substantial injus-
tice upon a party, and (ii) the injustice cannot otherwise be rem-
edied, as, for instance, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
60(b) or by relitigation under an exception to res judicata doc-
trine.' 46
146 Although mandates have also been recalled in criminal cases, this proposal deals only
with recalls in civil cases. This Note makes no attempt to discuss whether different policies
obtain in criminal cases and expresses no opinion on the efficacy of recalls in such cases.
As written, the proposal leaves open the possibility of recalls in criminal cases upon a
showing of substantial injustice.
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